Why is Universal Skepticism a Fallacy?

Skepticism is a practical impossibility.

No sane human being can live without certitude of a practical kind. Even the most confirmed skeptic, no matter how many reasons of a theoretical and speculative nature he may have for doubting the possibility of genuine certitude, cannot lead a human life without denying his skeptical theory all day long in his conduct. 

His life shows that he is certain of so many things: the physical world, with its seasons and changes of weather, with its periods of day and night, with its differences of time and space relations; his own body, in all its concrete reality, in its conditions of health and sickness, in its physical needs of food, drink, and sleep; the existence and knowability of other people and other minds, some of whom agree with him while others disagree, with whom he communicates by means of conversation and writing, and whom he tries to convince of the truth of universal doubt.  

The story is told of Pyrrho the Skeptic that, when chased one day by a rabid dog, he ran for safety without allowing his skepticism to exercise its doubt about the existence and viciousness of the brute. When the bystanders laughed at him and ridiculed him for the inconsistency of his action, he is said to have made the sage remark (completely out of keeping with his theory): "It is difficult to get away entirely from human nature." After all, he could not doubt, in an untheoretical moment, that his body and the dog were real objects. 

This discrepancy between fact and theory, between life and philosophic system, between practical certitude and speculative doubt, is an incontrovertible proof that universal doubt is impossibility except as a mere formulation of the mind. When facts and theories clash and contradict each other in such transparent fashion, the sane man will not deny the facts and cling to his theories, but will realize that something is radically wrong with his views. Facts cannot be denied. To persist in universal skepticism in the face of a million contradicting facts of life bespeaks either insanity or stubbornness of mind. 

When the inconsistency between life and theory cannot be harmonized, it will not do to deny life, because that would be ridiculous; the theory must be abandoned as essentially faulty. Universal skepticism, therefore, must be rejected as a practical impossibility.

The Brief Historical Sketch of Epistemological Skepticism

A number of ancient and modern philosophers have defended speculative skepticism. Among the ancient philosophers we find Protagoras (fifth century B.C.), Gorgias the Sophist (contemporary of Protagoras), Pyrrho (360-270 B.C.), Carneades (219-129 B.C.), Aenesidemus (first century B.C.), Agrippa (contemporary of Aenesidemus), and Sextus Empiricus (about second century A.D.).

Agrippa and Sextus Empiricus formulated the reasons for universal skepticism under five heads;

• The differences of opinions and theories among men
• The necessity of an infinite regress for every demonstration
• The subjective and relative character of all perception
• The gratuitous assumption of all axioms and principles
• The vicious circle or begging of question, involved in every syllogism.

Among Christian philosophers, universal skepticism never made headway. But the Renaissance, with its blind adoration of everything Grecian, again brought skepticism to the fore. Michael de Montaigne (1533-1592) in his Essais defended it. Others followed Montaigne in this trend of thought were Charron (1541-1603), Sanchez (1562-1632), Huet (1632-1721), Pascal (1623-1662), Bayle (1647-1706), and Jouffroy (1796-1841). Some of these were not really skeptics in principle. They attempted to show the constitutional inability of the human mind in its natural powers to arrive at truth, in order to vindicate the necessity of faith in divine revelation. It was a case of faulty apologetics.

Modern skepticism has its most noteworthy representative in David Hume (1711-1776). According to Hume, knowledge consists of mere perceptions, and these are twofold in character;

• Impressions, which are the more lively perceptions
• Ideas, which are but faint images of impressions

Though is thus reduced to sense-knowledge. All axioms and principles of science are the result of mere associations of impressions, made by the mind through force of habit; they are, therefore, purely subjective in nature and have no objective value. He considered the arguments of skeptics to be unassailable. In an indirect way, Hume's skepticism has exerted a powerful influence on modern thought.

It is obvious that a universal skeptic, who really and seriously doubts or denies the validity of all knowledge, cannot be convinced by any argument which may be advanced against his position: he would be forced to double the fact that such an argument has been advanced. He is as isolated in his skepticism as a fly buzzing in a vacuum; if, indeed, a fly can buzz in a vacuum, when both the fly and the vacuum probably are nonexistent. When we argue against skepticism, it is not our purpose to convert the skeptic himself; we intend to show non-skeptics that universal skepticism is folly. In doing so, we achieve a double result;

• We show directly that universal doubt is an improper approach to the problem of knowledge
• We demonstrate indirectly that any system which logically leads to skepticism must be intrinsically wrong.

Our contention is that universal skepticism cannot be the proper initial state of mind with which to approach the problem of knowledge, because it is a practical impossibility and philosophic absurdity.

Skepticism and Descartes' Doubt

It is the purpose of epistemology to test the validity of man's spontaneous convictions and see whether they are justifiable before the bar of rational criticism. If they are vindicated after a thorough investigation of their ultimate grounds and causes, they become reflex and philosophic certainties and will rest upon a firm, scientific basis. If, however, a critical examination should show that these spontaneous convictions are blind assents of the mind or are the result of some compulsory internal mechanism of the human mind, their truth-value will either be disproved or will remain forever in doubt.

In approaching the problem, the method employed will be a matter of great importance. A wrong method may produce disastrous results, just as a march from a false starting point, persistently carried on, will take the traveler far away from his goal; not every route will lead to the desired destination.

We must never overlook the fact that, while investigating the mind and its faculties, we are using this very mind and its faculties as the instruments of our investigation. On the face of it, this seems an unwarrantable procedure. Since the validity of the mind and its faculties is at stake, how can their use in this investigation be legitimate? The answer is: the truth of our whole domain of knowledge being under examination, the only legitimate procedure available is to analyze our knowledge reflectively and watch the operations of our mind in the formation of its spontaneous convictions, so as to see whether they are based upon truly rational grounds; there is no other way possible.

The only alternative would be to approach the problem in the attitude of complete doubts. The initial state of mind would then be to doubt absolutely everything, including the capability of the mind and its faculties to attain to any and all true knowledge. This, of course, would mean to approach the problem of human knowledge with the method of universal skepticism. At first blush, this would seem to be the logical thing to do--doubt everything from the start and then work our way upward toward certitude and truth. But this method would be fatal in its very inception.

Classes of Truth: The Mediate Judgments as Results of Inductive Process

The fourth class of truths is contained in mediate judgments which are the result of an inductive process generalizing the individual, concrete data of direct sense-perception into laws of a universal character.

 

The generalizations and laws of experimental science are of this type. After careful investigation and extensive experimentation the intellect perceives the essential elements in a series of repeated phenomena and occurrences and then expresses the true cause in a definite judgment or law.

 

It is not necessary for science to investigate every single case of the past and present; that, in fact, would be impossible. Since I have arrived at knowledge of the essential elements of the phenomenon in question, the law which the intellect has formulated has a universal and necessary value and applies with equal force to each and every phenomenon of that class.

 

An instance will make this clear. It was noticed that the boiling point of water is always +212 degrees Fahrenheit at sea level. Taking this as a starting point, scientists made a great number of experiments of boiling water at seal level, and the result was in each case the same: water boiled at +212 degrees Fahrenheit.

 

Thus the law was formulated by means of a generalization: 'The boiling point of water is +212 degree Fahrenheit at sea level.' This being an essential characteristic of water, it was not necessary to take every drop of water on the globe to sea level and boil it; scientists know that it will boil, because such is the nature of water.

 

Every such law is a mediate judgment which expresses a necessary and universal truth, based upon the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Principle of Causality.

 

 

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The Epistemological Problem

 

Classes of Truth: The Mediate Judgments to Attain Truth

The third classes of truths are those contained in mediate judgments deduced by inference (reasoning) from 'first principles.'

 

These mediate judgments are based on self-evident 'first principles' or 'axioms,' but they themselves are not self-evident; it takes a process of reasoning to show that they follow necessarily from these axioms.

 

Mathematical deductions are examples of this class of judgments. That 38,400 is divisible by 2,560 fifteen times is not in itself directly clear; but if we perform the division, or multiply 2,560 by 15, we can prove the truth of the judgment. Similarly, that the square of the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the sum of the squares constructed on the other two sides is clear enough when the proof is furnished by a process of reasoning: but it is not a self-evident truth like the statement that a plane square encloses four right angles.

 

A mere explanation or comparison of ideas will not suffice in these cases to perceive the truth of such judgments by means of immediate intuition; mediate inference is require to establish the logically necessary connection between such truths and the axioms upon which they are based. However, once this connection is demonstrated, these deductive judgments are as true as their 'first principles,' unless it can be proven that man's reasoning powers are essentially invalid in their operations. Man's conviction is, of course, that he can reason in a valid manner.

 

Provided, then that man's reasoning powers are essentially valid, these mediate judgments derived from 'first principles' possess universal, necessary, absolute truth.

 

 

Coming up next on Epistemology Today blog: 

Classes of Truth: The Mediate Judgments as Results of Inductive Process

Classes of Truth: The Immediate Judgments to Attain Truth

The second among the classes of truth are the immediate judgments containing truths which are derived from direct experience through internal and external sense-perceptions.

 

Here are examples: 'That lady waling along the street has a package under her arm.' 'That boy is running.' 'I have a pain in my tooth.' 'I am thinking and writing.' Such judgments refer to individual concrete facts, events, persons, and objects. We do not arrive at the truth of these judgments through a mere analysis of the ideas contained in them. Take the judgment, 'That boy is running.'

 

On comparing the ideas 'boy' and 'running' alone by themselves, independent of experience, I cannot know whether I should unite them into a judgment, because there is no necessary connection between the ideas 'boy' and 'running'; the boy might just as well be 'standing' or 'sitting' or 'walking.' That I actually judge, 'That boy is running,' is due to my actual experience of seeing him run. Such judgments, then, are not analytical but synthetic; they contain empirical truths, based on direct experience.

 

As such, therefore, they are not considered to be universal, necessary, and absolute truths; they are contingent and experiential truths which may change with changing circumstances. A comparison between this and the foregoing group of judgments will reveal at a glance that the synthetic judgments have by no means the general truth-value of the analytical judgments, so far as knowledge is concerned.

 

 

Coming up next on Epistemology Today blog: 

Classes of Truth: The Mediate Judgments to Attain Truth

 

Classes of Truth: The Analytical Judgments to Attain Truth

First of all, we possess analytical judgments, which contain truths directly evident to the intellect through a comparison or analysis of the ideas of the judgment, without the aid of any immediate sense-perception or logical reasoning. For instance: 'The whole is greater than any of its parts'; 'a plane square encloses four right angles'; 'something cannot be true and false at the same time'; 'it is impossible that a thing exist and not exist at the same time'; 'everything must have a sufficient reason.' Such judgments, called 'first principles,' are immediately evident to the intellect by merely analyzing the ideas contained in them, provided the intellect knows what these ideas mean. They need to demonstration and no direct sense-perception to verify them.

 

If I know what a 'plane square' is and what a 'right angle' is, a mere comparison of these two ideas will make it clear to the intellect that 'A plane square encloses four right angles,' one in each corner of the figure. Again, if I know what 'whole' and 'part' mean, it is evident with similar axioms. Such principles are at the bottom of all knowledge, and they are, as all admit, indubitably present in our spontaneous convictions.

 

Axioms, like the Principle of Identity, the Principle of Contradiction, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason, are used, consciously or unconsciously, in every act of reasoning and are considered to be universally, necessarily and absolutely true.

 

 

Coming up next on Epistemology Today blog: 

Classes of Truth: The Immediate Judgments to Attain Truth

 

Epistemological Classes of Truth

Truth, as we know, lies in the judgment. Not all truths, of course, are of equal value to man. That my shoe squeaks, is a truth of no importance, unless, perhaps, I were a burglar or a detective; so, too, the fact that there is a solitary cloud in the sky morning, is not a truth which will startle mankind. Such truths are commonplace and mean little. But scientific truths have far greater value. That, water, for instance, consists of one part oxygen and two parts hydrogen, is a truth the discovery of which meant a distinct advancement in human knowledge and progress, because it enabled man to acquire great quantities of these two useful elements. Philosophic truths possess even greater importance than scientific truths, because the validity of science depends upon them. Thus, the Principles of Contradiction and of Sufficient Reason underlie all being and knowledge and constitute the very foundation of the sciences. It will, therefore, not be amiss to classify the different kinds of truths as found in the judgments of the intellect, since the value of man's spontaneous convictions is closely connected with his insight into these truths. The validity of man's knowledge can be established only if the validity of such truths is established, and so it is well to know these classes of truth.

 

The above brief account furnishes us with a survey of the sources and main facts of knowledge as revealed in the spontaneous convictions of men. Sense-perception, intellection, and self-consciousness, all contribute their share toward the sum total of man's knowledge. There is one trait characteristic of all these spontaneous convictions: man's knowledge is a faithful and genuine representation of reality as it is in itself. And this reality is twofold: Ego and non-Ego; the ideal world of thought and the material world of physical objects; man himself and universe distinct from man. And man's mind can transcend itself, reach out and contact this outside world, assimilate it cognitionally, and thereby acquire a valid knowledge of things. This is the sum and substance of the facts as given in man's convictions.

 

On the next post, I will explain everything about the analytical judgment and why it is the first among the Classes of Truth. So, visit this blog for updates are posted everyday.

Epistemology: Convictions Based on Intellection

We now come to intellectual knowledge. This is distinctly 'human' knowledge appears in three phases: ideas, judgments and inferences. We are not concerned here with the nature of the intellect as such; we are interested in its knowledge as found in these three products of mental activity. Whatever we may think of their validity and truth, we cannot seriously doubt that we have ideas and judgments and inferences. They are facts, and they lie at the very core of the problem of knowledge.

 

An idea is the intellectual representation of a thing. My idea of a thing is very different from my sense-perception of that thing. For example: As I walk along, I see a man. He is white of skin, six feet two inches in height, with black eyes and black hair, slim but muscular, and a slight limp gives him a somewhat halting gait. He wears a cap, a brown suit, a gray topcoat, blue socks, and black oxfords. This is the picture of an individual human being as he meets the eye and is perceived by the sense of sight. But my 'idea' of this man is that he is a 'bodily, living, sentient, rational substance'; in other words, this man is a 'rational animal.' The sense perceives him in all his concrete individuality, with all the peculiar traits and characteristics which make him to be this man and differentiate him from every other human being. My 'idea' however, apprehends him in those essential attributes which he has in common with all other human beings, leaving aside all the individualizing and differentiating marks peculiar to himself. Sense-perception, therefore, represents man in the concrete; the idea represents him in the abstract.

 

Passing on to the judgments of the intellect, we find that a judgment is an act of the mind affirming or denying one idea of another. Three factors are involved in the making of a judgment:

 

·         Two ideas which are known

·         The mutual comparison of these two ideas

·         The mental pronouncement of their agreement or disagreement

 

The intellect, for instance, consciously apprehends and compares the ideas 'tree' and 'plant'; it finds that they agree; then it pronounces this agreement in the judgment, 'The tree is a plant.' But on comparing the ideas 'tree' and 'animal,' the intellect perceives that they do not agree and them makes the pronouncement, 'The tree is not an animal.' If my assertion (affirmation or denial) in the judgment is correctly made, it is a true judgment, that it contains truth or error, which makes the judgment such an important element in the problem of knowledge. Internal and external sense-perceptions present or represent things concretely, and ideas represent the essence of things abstractly; but judgments claim to express the truth about reality as it actually is in itself. When I say, 'This man is an Indian,' I mean to assert that he really is an Indian; I certainly do not intend to convey the impression that I am merely combining the two ideas 'this man' and 'Indian' in my mind. In fact, the ordinary man never adverts to the fact that his judgment consists of a 'subject' and a 'predicate' and a 'copula'; for him his judgments simply express reality as he sees and knows it to be, and he is certain that his judgments do actually represent reality.

 

The same is true of inferences. The mind does not always perceive the agreement or disagreement between two ideas by a direct comparison of the two, so that it can make an immediate judgment about them. That 'Two plus two are four' I know from a mere analysis of these ideas, and that 'The sun is shining' I know by opening my eyes and looking at the sky; but that 'The human soul is a spirit' is something I can neither see with my eyes nor perceive by a direct comparison of these two ideas. If, however, I can bring in a third known idea with which, upon comparison, I find the two ideas to agree, then I am justified in saying that these two ideas agree with each other. This is inference or reasoning; and it is defined as the mental process by which, from certain truths already known, the mind passes to another truth distinct from these but necessarily following from them. That man reasons and makes inferences of this kind, is a fact of everyday experience. And man is convinced that these inferences, since they consist of judgments and lead to a final judgment, are a valid form of knowledge and contain truth regarding reality as it is. Whenever people argue among themselves about facts and events, about politics or religion or science or sports or anything else, it is always with conviction that these arguments can lead them to truth and valid knowledge. The deductive reasoning of mathematics and the inductive processes of the experimental sciences are all based on this assumption.

 

Man possesses also intellectual consciousness. He is aware of the intellectual acts of apprehension (ideas), judgments and reasoning, and also of other states and acts of his being, as love, hatred, sorrow, happiness, volition. Furthermore, man is conscious of self, of his own Ego, in the acts of thinking, willing and sense-perceiving, and he recognizes his own self as the subject of these acts, the agent who performs them and in whom they occur. He is also aware that these acts in their varying forms differ among themselves, while he, in whom they take place and in whom they inhere as their subject, is one and indivisible. These facts are expressed by him in phrases like the following: 'I think,' 'I will,' 'I see,' 'I was angry,' 'I walk,' 'I am aware of myself.' These judgments show that man realizes that he consists of a body as well as of a mind and that these are different entities belonging to the same Ego. They also show that his Ego persists as an unchanging, permanent reality amid all the changing acts and states which come and go within his person. Finally, man perceives that, while his body is a part of his Ego, there are other bodies which do not belong to his Ego; there is, therefore, a world or universe distinct from his Ego, with an existence and reality of its own.

 

Such are the undeniable spontaneous convictions of man as manifested by his conscious states and expressed in his judgments.

 

 

Coming up next on Epistemology Today blog: 

Epistemological Classes of Truth

 

Epistemology: Other Forms of Sense Essential for Attaining the Truth

The common or central sense makes us aware of our sense-acts. It is the seat of sense-consciousness, notifying us of the presence of the perceptive acts mentioned above, of feelings, such as pleasure, grief, anger, desire, and of appetitive striving. The central sense enables us to distinguish in a concrete way between the various organs and perceptions and to locate them in the bodily system. That this is not a form of 'intellectual' knowledge can be seen from the actions of animals. They manifest no intellectual knowledge, but they are conscious of the different kinds of sense-perceptions and of the various parts of their body. The main point here is that man I convinced of the reality of his body and of outside objects as revealed by the coordinating action of the central sense.

 

The imagination uses the material supplied by the sense-perceptions to form images of its own fashioning. Dreams are the product of the imagination. But man also uses his imagination creatively, constructing a world of fancy which exists nowhere but in his mind. Man is conscious of the distinction between the figures of his fancy and the people of real life, between the pictured events of his dream and the actual occurrences of external happenings. During a dream he may be unable to recognize events as unreal, but upon awakening he becomes aware of their imaginary character. The essential difference between fancy and reality is perfectly clear to the ordinary man and forms one of his strongest spontaneous convictions.

 

Sense-memory recalls perceptions and events and recognizes them concretely as having been experienced before. It is able to locate these experiences in their proper sequence of time and place. We not only remember the persons and objects we have seen before, but we also remember the time and place of seeing them. That these memory images represent a reality distinct from these images is another spontaneous conviction of man.

 

The connection of instinct with the problem of knowledge is slight. While instinct plays a prominent part in the life history of animals, its function in man in limited, due to the predominant part exercised by man's intellect in the ordering of his actions. It is the cognitive function which apprehends material objects as things either harmful or useful to the organism consequent upon their perception. The influence of instinct is noticed chiefly in actions which are necessary for the preservation of the individual and of the race. Whatever instinct may amount to in man, it is stimulated by external objects and events and always has a reference to external reality: such is man's natural conviction.

 

All senses convey knowledge of the reality of the physical world in some form or other. That, at least, is the view of the average person, and of this he is certain beyond doubt. How far this obvious, spontaneous conviction can be justified before the bar of critical reason, is precisely the duty of the epistemologist to examine and determine.

 

 

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Epistemology: Other Forms of Sense Essential for Attaining the Truth

Epistemology: Convictions Based on Sense-Perception

All epistemologists admit that we have sense-perceptions, viewed as subjective states of our mental life. The knowledge obtained thereby is derived through various bodily senses; and man has the spontaneous conviction that this knowledge acquaints him with the reality of a material world.

 

There is the sense of sight. Nothing is clearer to the ordinary man than that what he sees is actually what and where he sees it to be. His own body, buildings, trees, fields and hills, the sun and the moon and the stars--he is convinced that he sees these things simply because they are parts of the outside world around him. They are present, whether he sees them or not; they have an existence of their own, independent of his perception of them, and the will retain their reality even when he is blind or dead. So, too, color and light are objective realities for him: the sun and the stars really shin, the rose is really red, and the grass is really green. The whole matter is simply too evident to be doubted. He feels so safe in accepting this knowledge conveyed to him by the sense of sight, that he would rather question the sanity of anyone doubting these things than entertain any misgivings concerning this knowledge itself.

 

Taste and smell confirm him in his conviction of the reality of things. Sugar is sweet, acid is sour, quinine is bitter, brine is salty. The ordinary man is certain that these objects possess these flavors as objective qualities. He is also convinced that objects emit real odors. Odor may be fruity, as in the peach, or spicy, as in cloves, or flowery as in the rose, or foul as in carrion or scorchy as in burned wood, or resinous as in pine pitch. But whether agreeable or disagreeable, he always refers these flavors and odors to things which are real and independent of his own person.

 

Hearing, according to his conviction, perceives sounds which emanate from actual objects. The human voice in its speech, the rapturous melody of the nightingale, the roar of the lion, the crash of the thunder--they actually exist in nature as he hears them. Sound to him is real; and he simply cannot understand that, in the absence of hearing in men and animals, nature would be totally devoid of sound.

 

The sense of touch also reveals various qualities which he considers to be objectively real. What is commonly called 'the sense of touch' consists of a number of distinct senses. The skin senses convey the sensations of temperature, pain and touch proper. The kinesthetic or muscle sense is located in the muscles and position of our bodily limbs and also of resistance and pressure. The organic sense has its seat in the internal organs of the body and enables us to perceive hunger, thirst, nausea, and general bodily well-being. How far these senses are fundamentally distinct is a matter for the psychologist to decide. Whatever their nature, the ordinary man is certain that they reveal to him his own body and other bodies, together with definite qualities, which are real in the world of physical objects.

 

Besides the senses just enumerated, the human organism possess what may be roughly designated the internal sense, because they enable man to apprehend facts of a subjective character in a sensuous manner. We are not concerned here with their ultimate nature and difference, but with certain undeniable facts of internal experience in so far as they have a bearing on the problem of knowledge.

 

 

Coming up next on Epistemology Today blog: 

Epistemology: Convictions Based on Intellection

Specification of the Problem in Epistemology

The first requisite for a rational solution of the problem of knowledge is a clear understanding of the ideas and terms which underlie the problem as a whole. The previous posts made us acquainted with these basic ideas and terms. The next requisite will be an exposition of the general facts which are given and granted by all, which form the common ground upon which all stand, which constitute the undisputed basis of the problem, and which are the universal starting point of all inquiry.

 

Knowledge we have. No one seriously doubts that we possess what is termed 'knowledge,' considered as a subjective state of the mind. What worries the philosophers is the firm and spontaneous conviction entertained by the generality of men, educated and uneducated alike, that this knowledge is a faithful representation of reality as it is in itself. They are not so sure that the ordinary man's claim to truth in this knowledge is justifiable beyond reasonable doubt. They feel that these spontaneous convictions must be critically investigated before their validity can be admitted. These convictions are obvious facts. We have them, and they cannot be argued out of existence. That they produce in us a subjective certitude, is also admitted as a fact; but what philosophers desire to establish is, whether this subjective certitude is grounded on objective reality. That is the vital question. It will be necessary, therefore, to make a general survey of these spontaneous convictions of mankind, considered solely as facts, in order to obtain a clearer conception of the problem.

 

Epistemology: The Motive of Certitude

Concerning the motive of certitude, which influences the mind in giving a firm assent to a judgment, there exists a difference in value; and this difference in value produces increasing degrees of certitude. We are conscious of the fact that we are not equally certain of all truths, even though all these truths are certain to our mind. There is a considerable range of 'more or less' in our certitude. Thus, I am sure beyond doubt that a country like China exists, even though I have never been there; but I am more sure of the existence of the United States. So, too, I am convinced of the spirituality of my soul, because I can prove it to my mind beyond reasonable doubt; but I am more certain of the reality of my body, because I have an immediate awareness of my body's presence. And so with many other truths.

 

The Moral Certitude

 

There is moral certitude, physical certitude and metaphysical certitude. Moral certitude is based upon a moral (not to be confounded with 'ethical') law, upon the customary natural conduct of human beings in a given environment and under given conditions. It has been observed that men under such circumstances act and react uniformly in the same way. We are, for instance, certain that 'Parents love their children.' While we realize that some parents do not conform to this law of human conduct, an that consequently we might be mistaken in individual cases, we feel certain that the law, generally speaking, expresses a truth. 'A nation, whose citizen lives in reasonable comfort is not prone to revolution,' is a similar truth which is morally certain. 'Youth is gay and craves excitement,' is another.

 

The Physical Certitude

 

Physical certitude is based upon a physical law of nature, and the latter is considered to be uniform, necessary and universal. Exceptions to such law are impossible in the nature order of thins. Only nature's Creator and Lawgiver could suspend the effects of a physical law. Such laws are, for example: 'Gases expand in heat'; 'water will freeze at sea level, when the temperature drops to +32 degrees Fahrenheit.'; 'a body, whose specific gravity is less than that of water, will float in water'; 'two parts of hydrogen, when united to one part of oxygen form water'; 'a magnet will attract iron.' In such similar cases we are physically certain that our judgments are true. We have no fear that the opposite will happen except through a miracle. Physical certitude is far greater than moral certitude. Necessity rules in the physical laws; while in matters of customary conduct the human will can bring about individual exceptions.

 

The Metaphysical Certitude

 

Metaphysical certitude is based upon a metaphysical law, an exception to which is intrinsically impossible, because it would involve a contradiction in itself. We are utterly convinced that no power, not even the Omnipotent Himself, can change truths like the following: '2+2=4'; '7+5=20-8'; 'the part is smaller than the whole'; 'every change demands an adequate cause'; 'a circle is no square.' There is an absolute necessity to these things which nothing can ever alter, and our certitude is in proportion to this recognized necessity: it is an irresistible certitude.

 

A mere glance at the truths contained in the judgments expressing these three classes of truths will show us that there are increasing degrees  in our certitude regarding them. We have moral certitude concerning many things, but it does not give us the firmness of assent which we possess with respect to truths of the physical order; and the firmness of our assent in metaphysical certitude is far superior to that given to truths of the moral and physical order. All three classes of truths produce certitude in our mind; but the motive of certitude is greater in the one than in the other, causing a correspondingly firmer assent.

 

Once again, however, it must be remembered that our sole purpose here is to explain and delimit the idea of certitude as it is found to be present in our consciousness, without intending to presuppose the reasonableness and justifiability of this idea. The fact is that we do possess these different types of certitude and that men in general are convinced of their validity. How far they are justified in this assumption is a question still to be answered in the course of our investigation. We may essential requisite for rational discussion. We can hope to arrive at a correct solution of this difficult and important problem only when the fundamental ideas of 'knowledge,' 'truth,' 'error,' 'doubt,' 'opinion,' and 'certitude' are clearly understood in their relation to each other and to the problem at large.

 

These ideas are basic; they lie at the very root of knowledge; and their proper understanding should assist materially in preparing us to meet the problem of knowledge in an intelligent manner.

Epistemology: The Certitude and the Truth

Certitude is the state of the mind in which it gives a firm assent to a judgment without fear of the possibility of error due to recognized valid reasons.

 

Three elements, therefore, enter into the concept of certitude: the firm assent to the judgment, the absence of fear of possible error, and the understanding of the valid reasons which exclude this fear.

 

The absence of the fear of possible error is the negative factor which distinguishes certitude from doubt and opinion, while the consciously apprehend valid reasons for the firm assent of the mind are the positive factor of conviction or certitude. This, of course, does not mean that the mind is really infallible in these convictions and that error is impossible in all these judgments.

 

What it does mean, though, is that the mind is subjectively certain of its grounds and does not fear the possibility of error; it is convinced that it is in possession of knowledge which is true and valid.

 

The educated man and the savage alike are convinced that the sun is an existing reality in the sky. The savage, furthermore, is convinced that the sun actually travels through the sky from east to west in the course of the day, while the educated man is certain that it does not; one of these two (subjective) certitudes must be wrong, because they are contradictory and mutually exclusive and cannot be true at the same time.

 

While, then, subjective certitude does not exclude the possibility of error, it does always exclude the fear of error in the mind of him who possesses certitude.

Epistemology: The Opinion on the Truth

Opinion is a state of the mind in which it decides for the truth of a judgment, but with fear of possibility of error. The best that the mind can attain with regard to the truth of its judgment is a certain amount of probability.

 

The reasons are good on both sides of the question; but the mind realizes that reasons for making the decision are weighty enough to justify adherence to one side of the question rather than to the other. The fear of error, however, hinders the mind from giving an unqualified assent to the judgment; there is still lack of certitude. Here is a case in point: Will the communists continue to rule for any great length of time in Russia? The fact that they have ruled many years is a good reason to assume that they will. But the fact that their rule is imposed by force and is fundamentally contrary to human nature, is apparently a better reason to suppose that it cannot last.

 

If I decide for the latter side of the question, I have an opinion that the communists will not continue to remain in power for any great length of time. Or, supposing all the evidence in a criminal case has been presented in court, and it is circumstantial and conflicting. I may weight this evidence and decide that the defendant is guilty, although I realize that there is good evidence against such a judgment: I have formed an opinion on the case.

 

Both in doubts and opinions there is lack of certitude. In doubts I can come to no decision, but in opinions I make a decision. in neither instance, though, can I overcome the fear of the possibility of error.

 

The mind is in a condition of hesitancy and uneasiness and remains in this attitude as long as a prudent fear of error lingers on. As soon as this fear of error is definitely overcome, hesitancy and uneasiness vanish and the min is at rest in a state of certitude.

Epistemology: The Attitudes towards Truth

Regarding many things man is certain that he possesses knowledge. He is equally certain that there are far more things of which he is totally ignorant. Again, he is conscious of the fact that he has made many errors in the past and that much of his present knowledge may be erroneous. He realizes also that he has no exhaustive and fully adequate knowledge of things, not even of himself. The consciousness of all this is reflected in his mental attitude toward the things he knows or thinks he know. These attitudes are doubt, opinion, and certitude.

 

What Doubt Is

 

Doubt is that state of the mind in which a suspended judgment ensues, due to the mind's inability to decide whether the judgment is true or false. If the mind can discover no reasons, or practically no reasons, which enable it to come to a decision regarding the truth or error of its judgment, then the doubt is negative. If it has discovered reasons, but if they are of practically equal weight for and against the truth of the judgment, thereby making a decisive judgment impossible, then the doubt is positive.

 

In both cases the result is the same: the fear of error cannot be overcome, and the judgment remains suspended. For example: Dark, heavy clouds are scurrying across the sky, and it looks as if it would rain. But the wind is high, and the clouds are traveling fast. Will it rain? The appearance of the weather indicates rain; but, the high winds may drive the clouds away. It might rain, but I fear it will not, and so I suspend my judgment: I doubt. Another case: Will the Army or the Navy win this year's football game?

 

Both have brilliant players; the one team is noted for its power, the other for its deceptive plays. The situation is such that the mind can come to no real decision: it doubts. And so there are innumerable instances where man cannot overcome his doubts.

Truth and Error

Knowledge has the quality of truth and error. The absence of knowledge in a being capable of possessing it is termed ignorance; thus, a man who does not know whether zinc is an element or a compound is in ignorance as to the nature of zinc. The absence of knowledge in a being incapable of possessing it is termed nescience; an animal, like a dog, does not and cannot know whether zinc is an element or a compound, and he is in a state of nescience regarding this fact.

 

It is only in the act of knowledge that we have truth and error. Truth and error enter into our knowledge, when this knowledge is expressed in judgments; that is when we affirm or deny something of something else. If what we affirm is really so as we affirm it to be, we have truth; otherwise we have error. For instance: I take a piece of metal in my hand, examine it, and state mentally, 'This is brass and not gold.' I both affirm and deny something here of the metal in my hand; I affirm it to be 'brass' and I deny it to be 'gold.' if this metal is really brass and not gold, then my double assertion (affirmation and denial) contains truth; but if it be really gold and not brass, then I am mistaken, and my double assertion contains error. As long as I merely look at the metal and form an idea of it, my knowledge is neither true nor false; but as soon as I apply an idea to the metal and mentally assert (affirm or deny) something about this metal in a judgment, then this judgment-knowledge automatically becomes true or false, depending upon whether or not my judgment and assertion corresponds to the reality-in-itself. Truth and error, therefore, are found in the judgment. This is mental or logical truth, and it consists in the conformity of the mind to the thing. Logical error is defined as a disconformity of the mind to the thing.

 

When we speak of truth as the 'conformity' of the mind to the thing, we do not mean that the 'nature' of the mind must conform to the 'nature' of the thing; we mean that the mind must conform to the thing cognitionally in its judgment.

 

There is, however, also truth in the things. We have, for example, a very definite notion of the metal called silver. This notion or idea of silver involves a number of subordinate ideas regarding the color, the specific gravity, the malleability, the hardness, the chemical constitution of silver; and this notion is a norm or standard to which a metal must conform in order to be designated silver. If the metal agrees with this standard, it is true silver, otherwise it is false silver.

 

The silver used in jewelry and that used in government coins is true silver; but German silver, being an alloy of copper, zinc and nickel is false silver because the real silver, being a chemical element of its own, contains none of these metals. When a stenographer copies a letter and the copy does not agree with the original, then the copy is false or erroneous; only if the copy agrees in every respect with the original is it considered a true copy. When, therefore, objects conform to a recognized mental norm or standard, they are said to possess 'truth of being' or 'ontological truth.' Ontological Truth is thus defined as the conformity of a thing to the mind. Reversely, ontological error consists in the disconformity of a thing to the mind.

 

From the explanation above, it will be clear how truth in general must be defined: it is the conformity between mind and thing. Error in general is the disconformity between mind and thing. Men universally distinguish between truth and error and consider them irreconcilable opposites. In epistemology must deal with logical truth and error, because its problem is concerned with the validity of human knowledge. The fundamental question is this: Can the mind transcend itself, reach to reality outside itself, conform to reality, and thereby acquire truth? There can, of course, be no question whether men think they can acquire a true knowledge of reality; all men have a natural, spontaneous, universal, and unshakable conviction that their mind knows many truths which give them a trustworthy insight into the nature and qualities of things. They are certain that their knowledge does conform to reality.

 

The fact of this conviction concerning the possession of logical truth is acknowledged by all; whether and how far this conviction is justified, will have to be determined by the critical examination of all the data and facts in the case. At present we are merely interested in acquiring a clear conception of the ideas and terms involved. For that purpose it was necessary to specify the exact meaning of truth and error in so far as they may be found in human knowledge.

 

What You Should Know About Knowledge

When we speak of the 'problem of knowledge,' it is not a question whether man possesses 'knowledge.' That is a fact which no one denies. So we must begin with the idea of 'knowledge.'

 

Knowledge is a primary fact of human life and experience. Everyone understands what it means 'to know,' 'to have knowledge.' But when we attempt to explain and analyze this idea, we immediately encounter difficulties. Just because it is a primary fact of experience, the idea of 'knowledge' eludes every effort at an exact definition. We can point out certain characteristics of 'knowledge' and adduce definite instances of 'knowledge,' but we cannot really define it. 'To know' is on a par with 'to see,' 'to taste,' 'to touch,' 'to imagine,' 'to will.' Man is simply conscious of these states of his being and gives them a name; and thus he arrives at the idea and the term. It is useless to try to explain to a man born blind what 'color' or even 'seeing' is; just as it is useless to explain to a man born deaf what 'sound' or 'hearing' is.

 

We can place a man in a certain position and say to him; 'Open your eyes and tell me what you see across the park.' 'I see the Court House.' 'You are sure of it?' 'Yes, I am sure of it.' 'Then you know that the Court House is there.' Or we can say to him: 'Listen; do you recognize the melody?' 'It is the Funeral March of Chopin.' 'Good; then you know the melody.' Again, we may notice that he looks ill and ask: 'What is the matter?' 'I have a headache.' 'Well, then you know what pain feels like.' And so on. It is the experience of this sort which constitutes 'knowing' and 'knowledge.'

 

Now, there are three elements which enter into knowledge: the knowing subject, the known object, and the mental act of knowing (cognition). The subject is the one who knows; the object is the thing that is known; and cognition or knowing is the mental act which makes this object known to the subject.

 

The subject, the knower, is man as we notice it in the phrase: 'This man knows his business.' Taken individually, it is the Ego, the 'I myself,' who am the knowing subject, for we say: 'I know this house, this game, this boy.' All our activities are referred to the Ego as the subject. We become aware of this, if we reflect upon the following expressions: 'I walked a mile; I saw an accident occur; I feel a pain in my side; I taste garlic in my food; I smell a pleasant odor in the kitchen; I thought about the depression; I know about the plans of my friend; I was conscious of the act.' Knowledge, then, as a mental activity, belongs to the Ego, the self, as the 'subject' who knows. And it is in this sense that the idea of 'subject' must be taken in the epistemological problem of knowledge, because that is the spontaneous conviction involved in our way of thinking.

 

The object of knowledge is anything and everything that is, or becomes, or can be, known by man. According to man's spontaneous conviction the objects of his knowledge comprise his own self, various conscious states of his self, and also realities-other-than-self, is a plain fact which he manifests in numberless judgments of everyday life: 'The sun is shining; the wind is blowing; the meal is good; this building is tall; some roses are red.' In all such judgments the ordinary man refers his knowledge to some object, and he is sure that the object is as real as the subject. Whether his common sense view that such 'realities-other-than-self' belong to an exterior world with an independent existence of their own outside man's mind, is precisely one of the problems to be solved. But that every act of knowledge must be 'knowledge of something' and therefore refer to some object is perfectly clear and is disputed by nobody.

 

The object becomes known to the subject by the act of knowing. This act, of course, takes place in the subject or knower. It is a unitive act, in as much as it brings the object and the subject into contact with each other, thereby rendering the object 'present to' the subject and making the subject 'aware' of this presence of the object. Before being known, the object is merely an 'object-in-itself'; but through and in the act of knowing it now becomes an 'object-to-the-mind.' and it is by becoming an object-to-the-mind that a thing becomes 'known.' Somehow or other, then, an external physical object (if there be such) must become untied to the mind of the subject by means of the cognitional act and be presented to the Ego as an 'object-to-the-mind,' in order that it can become 'known' by the subject; in other words, the object must become intra-mental and intra-subjective, before it can be known. A simple example may make this clearer. I see a burning house and 'know' it to be burning. How do I get to know this fact? The house is perhaps a hundred yards from where I stand.

 

Surely my mind does not leave my person, cross the intervening space and physically contact the flaming building nor does the burning house leave its foundation, travel over to me, enter my mind and then actually burn inside my person. Nevertheless, the burning house and my mind must become united in some way, or I could not know that the house is burning. Since the house has no physical presence inside my mind, it must have a cognitional presence there by means of sense-perception and thought. An object, then, in order to become known by the subject must acquire an intra-mental and intra-subjective presence or existence, must become an object-to-the-mind, must have a mental objectivity, must become an ideal being.

 

The very act of knowledge demands this sort of presence of the object in the subject; otherwise no union would take place between subject and object, and knowledge would not be possible. The question, of course, arises: Has this object (for instance, the burning house mentioned earlier) a real, extra-mental existence of its own outside the self and the mind, independent of the cognitional existence which it has in the mind in the act of knowledge? The ordinary man is convinced that it has an objectively real existence outside the mind; idealists on the contrary, assert that we can know nothing but what takes place subjectively in our mind, and that we therefore have no right to affirm the existence of any thing-other-than-self. And so we again are face to face with the fundamental problem of knowledge. Whatever the solution, this much is clear and recognized by all: an object, in order to be known must be cognitionally present in the subject in the act of knowing.

 

The subject, the object, and the act of knowing are thus the essential elements necessary for knowledge. Whatever pertains to, or proceeds from, the subject is subjective; and whatever pertains to, or proceeds from, the object is objective. The state or condition of being subjective or being objective is then styled subjectivity or objectivity. And anything that pertains to, or proceeds from, the act of knowing or cognition is termed cognitional or intentional. Knowledge will thus be either subjective or objective; viewed from the standpoint of the subject who knows, it is subjective; and considered as referring to the object which is known, it is objective. So much for knowledge as it exists in the knower.

Epistemology: The Science of Knowledge

Epistemology (from the Greek word episteme which means knowledge and logos which means doctrine) is the science of the validity, or truth-value of human knowledge. It is a 'science'; that is, it is a definite body of truths, derived from reasoned demonstrations of causes and reduced to a system. It is the 'science of human knowledge.'

 

Here we have the general subject-matter of epistemology: it is not the purpose of this department of philosophy to investigate the nature of the human mind and its faculties, but that phase of the mind's activity which we designate by the term 'knowledge.' It is the 'science of the validity, or truth-value, of human knowledge.' This is the special or formal subject-matter of epistemology, distinguishing it from the other departments of philosophy and from every other science. The sciences are concerned with knowledge, because they increase our knowledge of things; but they do not treat of knowledge from the standpoint of its 'validity' or 'truth-value.' It is the purpose of epistemology to submit our knowledge to a critical examination and investigate the rational grounds on which it rests, so as to discover whether and why we are justified in having the spontaneous conviction that our knowledge is valid and true in its claim to be a faithful interpretation of reality.

 

The definition shows us in what way epistemology differs from logic and psychology--two sciences closely related to epistemology. Logic is the science of 'correct' thinking. It gives us the laws and methods which we must follow, if we desire to avoid error and inconsistency in our mental acts; it is concerned chiefly with the proper arrangements of our ideas, judgments, and argumentations, so that a legitimate conclusion can be drawn from given truths. Psychology is the science of the soul in its nature and activities. This embraces everything pertaining to the soul of man, including knowledge. But so far as knowledge is concerned, psychology endeavors to lay bare its origin and nature, rather than its validity or truth-value.

 

Epistemology, as a special science, leaves aside the formal correctness, the origin and nature of the act of knowledge, and seeks to establish its validity and truth in so far as it is supposed to be knowledge of things. For that is a peculiarity of human knowledge: we are convinced that it actually makes us acquainted with reality and gives us a true conception of reality as it is in itself. This conviction, however, cannot simply be assumed; it must be established beyond reasonable doubt, otherwise philosophy and science will be without secure foundation. It is plain that, because of the close relationship existing between logic, psychology, and epistemology, it must at times reach over into the fields of the other two sciences, because an understanding of the laws and nature of thinking is necessary to form a proper judgment about he truth-claim of knowledge. As such, then, epistemology differs from logic and psychology.

 

The term 'epistemology' is of comparatively recent origin. Formerly it often went under the names of 'applied logic,' 'material logic,' 'critical logic,' or 'noetics.' Now it is customary to separate this part of philosophy from the logic and treat it as a special science. The reason for this procedure lies in the fact that the problem of knowledge has become the major philosophical problem of the past three centuries. This does not mean that the validity of human knowledge had received little attention in the preceding ages. It had been discussed since the very beginnings of philosophy in ancient Greece; but it has never held the predominant position in the minds of thinkers that it occupies today. Today it is the problem of philosophy. The importance of the problem will become apparent as we advance in our investigation.

 

Epistemology is sometimes called criteriology. But there is a distinction between the two. Criteriology, as the term implies, is the science of the criteria of truth. The criterion of truth is the norm or test or standard which enables us to distinguish truth from error. Any theory of knowledge, to be complete, must treat of the criterion of truth; but there are many other questions involved in the validity of knowledge. Criteriology, therefore, is only a part of epistemology and as such does not cover the entire field usually assigned to what is known as 'the problem of knowledge.' Epistemology, on the other hand, considers this wider and more fundamental problem in all its phases.

 

Criteriology asks the question: 

·         What distinguishes truth from error? 

Epistemology asks the question: 

·         Is our knowledge of things objectively valid and true? 

Plainly, we can inquire into the existence and nature of the criterion of truth only after we have established the prior fact of the validity, or truth-value, or our knowledge in general.

 

This then, is the problem which confronts us: To investigate human knowledge and seek to determine the rational grounds upon which the validity of our spontaneous convictions are based. If we can establish this validity, these convictions will be critically and philosophically justifies; if we cannot, our common and scientific knowledge must be considered to the nothing better than conjectures which may give us more or less probability but never the security of philosophic certitude.