Pages

Truth and Error

Knowledge has the quality of truth and error. The absence of knowledge in a being capable of possessing it is termed ignorance; thus, a man who does not know whether zinc is an element or a compound is in ignorance as to the nature of zinc. The absence of knowledge in a being incapable of possessing it is termed nescience; an animal, like a dog, does not and cannot know whether zinc is an element or a compound, and he is in a state of nescience regarding this fact.

 

It is only in the act of knowledge that we have truth and error. Truth and error enter into our knowledge, when this knowledge is expressed in judgments; that is when we affirm or deny something of something else. If what we affirm is really so as we affirm it to be, we have truth; otherwise we have error. For instance: I take a piece of metal in my hand, examine it, and state mentally, 'This is brass and not gold.' I both affirm and deny something here of the metal in my hand; I affirm it to be 'brass' and I deny it to be 'gold.' if this metal is really brass and not gold, then my double assertion (affirmation and denial) contains truth; but if it be really gold and not brass, then I am mistaken, and my double assertion contains error. As long as I merely look at the metal and form an idea of it, my knowledge is neither true nor false; but as soon as I apply an idea to the metal and mentally assert (affirm or deny) something about this metal in a judgment, then this judgment-knowledge automatically becomes true or false, depending upon whether or not my judgment and assertion corresponds to the reality-in-itself. Truth and error, therefore, are found in the judgment. This is mental or logical truth, and it consists in the conformity of the mind to the thing. Logical error is defined as a disconformity of the mind to the thing.

 

When we speak of truth as the 'conformity' of the mind to the thing, we do not mean that the 'nature' of the mind must conform to the 'nature' of the thing; we mean that the mind must conform to the thing cognitionally in its judgment.

 

There is, however, also truth in the things. We have, for example, a very definite notion of the metal called silver. This notion or idea of silver involves a number of subordinate ideas regarding the color, the specific gravity, the malleability, the hardness, the chemical constitution of silver; and this notion is a norm or standard to which a metal must conform in order to be designated silver. If the metal agrees with this standard, it is true silver, otherwise it is false silver.

 

The silver used in jewelry and that used in government coins is true silver; but German silver, being an alloy of copper, zinc and nickel is false silver because the real silver, being a chemical element of its own, contains none of these metals. When a stenographer copies a letter and the copy does not agree with the original, then the copy is false or erroneous; only if the copy agrees in every respect with the original is it considered a true copy. When, therefore, objects conform to a recognized mental norm or standard, they are said to possess 'truth of being' or 'ontological truth.' Ontological Truth is thus defined as the conformity of a thing to the mind. Reversely, ontological error consists in the disconformity of a thing to the mind.

 

From the explanation above, it will be clear how truth in general must be defined: it is the conformity between mind and thing. Error in general is the disconformity between mind and thing. Men universally distinguish between truth and error and consider them irreconcilable opposites. In epistemology must deal with logical truth and error, because its problem is concerned with the validity of human knowledge. The fundamental question is this: Can the mind transcend itself, reach to reality outside itself, conform to reality, and thereby acquire truth? There can, of course, be no question whether men think they can acquire a true knowledge of reality; all men have a natural, spontaneous, universal, and unshakable conviction that their mind knows many truths which give them a trustworthy insight into the nature and qualities of things. They are certain that their knowledge does conform to reality.

 

The fact of this conviction concerning the possession of logical truth is acknowledged by all; whether and how far this conviction is justified, will have to be determined by the critical examination of all the data and facts in the case. At present we are merely interested in acquiring a clear conception of the ideas and terms involved. For that purpose it was necessary to specify the exact meaning of truth and error in so far as they may be found in human knowledge.

 

No comments:

Post a Comment

 

Most Reading

Sidebar One

The validity or truth-value of human knowledge is the crucial problem in modern Philosophy. It has agitated the minds of philosophers for more than three centuries and the effects of their discussions are felt in every department of science. Naturally so, since it lies in the very nature of Epistemology to question the capability of man's mind to contact reality and to know what things are in themselves, the validity of all knowledge, and consequently also of science, is at stake. The foundations of human knowledge are challenged, examined, and frequently attacked. An acquaintance with this problem and its possible solution will be, therefore, a matter of prime importance for every seeker of truth and for every student of Philosophy.

 

This blog is intended for those who have no previous acquaintance with the subject. In accordance with this purpose, we have endeavored to place the problem in its proper historical setting, showing its origin and development, without confusing the issue with a large amount of historical detail. For the same reason, the subject (Epistemology) is treated in a constructive manner, seeking a positive solution of the Epistemological problem rather than giving an extensive criticism and refutation of the individual opposing systems of thought.

 

The language, so far as consistent with the matter under discussion, is plain and simple, avoiding what Hugh S. Elliot styles "sesquipedalian verbiage." Much of our modern philosophical jargon is so well-nigh incomprehensible as to make the underlying ideas opaque unintelligibility is not necessarily depth. Obscurities, of course, remain because the nature of knowledge itself is obscure; no amount of words will ever be able to clarify completely the mystery of the mind.