Epistemology: The Motive of Certitude

Concerning the motive of certitude, which influences the mind in giving a firm assent to a judgment, there exists a difference in value; and this difference in value produces increasing degrees of certitude. We are conscious of the fact that we are not equally certain of all truths, even though all these truths are certain to our mind. There is a considerable range of 'more or less' in our certitude. Thus, I am sure beyond doubt that a country like China exists, even though I have never been there; but I am more sure of the existence of the United States. So, too, I am convinced of the spirituality of my soul, because I can prove it to my mind beyond reasonable doubt; but I am more certain of the reality of my body, because I have an immediate awareness of my body's presence. And so with many other truths.

 

The Moral Certitude

 

There is moral certitude, physical certitude and metaphysical certitude. Moral certitude is based upon a moral (not to be confounded with 'ethical') law, upon the customary natural conduct of human beings in a given environment and under given conditions. It has been observed that men under such circumstances act and react uniformly in the same way. We are, for instance, certain that 'Parents love their children.' While we realize that some parents do not conform to this law of human conduct, an that consequently we might be mistaken in individual cases, we feel certain that the law, generally speaking, expresses a truth. 'A nation, whose citizen lives in reasonable comfort is not prone to revolution,' is a similar truth which is morally certain. 'Youth is gay and craves excitement,' is another.

 

The Physical Certitude

 

Physical certitude is based upon a physical law of nature, and the latter is considered to be uniform, necessary and universal. Exceptions to such law are impossible in the nature order of thins. Only nature's Creator and Lawgiver could suspend the effects of a physical law. Such laws are, for example: 'Gases expand in heat'; 'water will freeze at sea level, when the temperature drops to +32 degrees Fahrenheit.'; 'a body, whose specific gravity is less than that of water, will float in water'; 'two parts of hydrogen, when united to one part of oxygen form water'; 'a magnet will attract iron.' In such similar cases we are physically certain that our judgments are true. We have no fear that the opposite will happen except through a miracle. Physical certitude is far greater than moral certitude. Necessity rules in the physical laws; while in matters of customary conduct the human will can bring about individual exceptions.

 

The Metaphysical Certitude

 

Metaphysical certitude is based upon a metaphysical law, an exception to which is intrinsically impossible, because it would involve a contradiction in itself. We are utterly convinced that no power, not even the Omnipotent Himself, can change truths like the following: '2+2=4'; '7+5=20-8'; 'the part is smaller than the whole'; 'every change demands an adequate cause'; 'a circle is no square.' There is an absolute necessity to these things which nothing can ever alter, and our certitude is in proportion to this recognized necessity: it is an irresistible certitude.

 

A mere glance at the truths contained in the judgments expressing these three classes of truths will show us that there are increasing degrees  in our certitude regarding them. We have moral certitude concerning many things, but it does not give us the firmness of assent which we possess with respect to truths of the physical order; and the firmness of our assent in metaphysical certitude is far superior to that given to truths of the moral and physical order. All three classes of truths produce certitude in our mind; but the motive of certitude is greater in the one than in the other, causing a correspondingly firmer assent.

 

Once again, however, it must be remembered that our sole purpose here is to explain and delimit the idea of certitude as it is found to be present in our consciousness, without intending to presuppose the reasonableness and justifiability of this idea. The fact is that we do possess these different types of certitude and that men in general are convinced of their validity. How far they are justified in this assumption is a question still to be answered in the course of our investigation. We may essential requisite for rational discussion. We can hope to arrive at a correct solution of this difficult and important problem only when the fundamental ideas of 'knowledge,' 'truth,' 'error,' 'doubt,' 'opinion,' and 'certitude' are clearly understood in their relation to each other and to the problem at large.

 

These ideas are basic; they lie at the very root of knowledge; and their proper understanding should assist materially in preparing us to meet the problem of knowledge in an intelligent manner.